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 Ant colony Optimization is a nature-inspired meta-heuristic optimization 
algorithm that gained a great interest in resolution of combinatorial and 
numerical optimization problems in many science and engineering domains. 
The aim of this work was to investigate the use of Ant Colony Optimization 
in cryptanalysis of Simplified Advanced Encryption Standard (S-AES), using 
a known plaintext attack. We have defined the essential components of our 
algorithm such as heuristic value, fitness function and the strategy to update 
pheromone trails. It is shown from the experimental results that our proposed 
algorithm allow us to break S-AES cryptosystem after exploring a minimum 
search space when compared with others techniques and requiring only two 
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cryptology is one of the most significant techniques for achieving information security which is 
become a vital need in communication networks and computer systems. Cryptology is the science of building 
and analysing different encryption and decryption systems. It consists of two subfields; Cryptography and 
Cryptanalysis. Cryptography is the study of building new powerful and efficient encryption and decryption 
algorithms. Cryptanalysis is the art of deciphering communications that are secured by cryptography, it is 
used to find weakness and flaws of ciphers. 
Actually, research in the cryptology field are increasingly using evolutionary techniques, 
encouraged by the promising obtained results. Specially, Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) which is a  
well-known meta-heuristic that was successfully used for solving a various real-world optimization 
problems. Recently , Ant Colony Optimization was used to attack DES (Data Encryption Standard) by 
Salabat Khan et al. in [1]. Also, Grari et al. [2] proposed a novel attack of Simple Substitution Ciphers based 
on Ant Colony Optimization. 
In this paper, we introduce a novel cryptanalytic attack of Simplified Advanced Encryption Standard 
(S-AES) using Ant Colonny Optimization . we have modelled the cryptanalysis’s problem to a combinatorial 
problem in order to apply ACO metaheuristic to break the Simplified-AES cryptosystem. We will show that 
our approach is significantly faster and requires a smaller number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs, when 
compared to others attacks. 
The cryptanalysis of S-AES has been the subject of several previous works. Mainly, Musa et al. [3] 
attacked S-AES for the first time using linear and differential cryptanalysis, concluding that their linear 
cryptanalytic attack seems very attractive compared to a pure brute force attack, requiring 109 plaintext and 
the corresponding ciphertext pairs to attack only the first round in S-AES. Mansoori et al. [4, 5] applied  
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a linear cryptanalysis to S-AES . It has been shown that at least 116 plaintext and corresponding cipher text 
pairs are required to break the first round and 548 to break the second round, concluding that S-AES is 
vulnerable against linear attack. While, Simmons [6] performed an algebraic cryptanalysis to S-AES, by 
resolving a system of polynomial equation. However, some others attacks based on metaheuristics were 
carried out such as Valarmathi and Vimalathithan [7, 8] which attacked S-AES using Genetic Algorithm [7] 
and Particle Swarm Optimization [8], they break the key used in S-AES in a minimum search space 
compared to brute force attack. Rania Saeed and Ashraf Bhery [9] proposed cryptanalysis of S-AES using 
Intelligent Agent needing only one plaintext. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce Simplified 
Advanced Encryption Standard. In section 3, we describe the Ant colony optimization meta-heuristic. 
The fully automated attack is given in section 7, with experimental results in section 5. Finally, conclusions 
are given in section 6. 
 
 
2. SIMPLIFIED ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (S-AES) 
Simplified Advanced Encryption Standard (S-AES) is a block Cipher algorithm that takes a 16-bit 
plaintext and 16-bit key as input to generates 16-bit ciphertext as output. The 16-bit input plaintext are treated 
as 4x4 matrix of nibbles (a nibble is a 4-bits block), called state. Each round takes a state and generates a new 
one to be used in the next round. Four transformations are used in S-AES: Substitution (SubNibbles), shift 
row, mix columns and add round key. Figure 1 shows encryption algorithm, key generation and decryption 
algorithm for S-AES. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. S-AES Encryption and decryption 
 
 
SubNibbles (S-box): is the only nonlinear component in the algorithm that provides confusion 
effect, the substitution table used for this purpose is described in (1). It takes a 4-bit input and produces  
a 4-bit output. In the input nibble, the left 2 bits determine the row and the right 2 bits determine  
the column of the substitution table. The hexadecimal value at the junction of the row and the column is the  
output nibble. 
 
𝑆 = [
9 4 𝐴 𝐵
𝐷 1 8 5
6 2 0 3
𝐶 𝐸 𝐹 7
]   (1) 
 
ShiftRows: In this step the, the first row of the state matrix remains unchanged. While the second 
row, a one-nibble circular shift is performed. 
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MixColumns: As a third step, the MixColumns transformation operates at the column of the matrix; 
each column of the state is transformed into a new column. The transformation is actually the matrix 
multiplication of a state column by a constant square matrix. The nibbles in the state column and constants 
matrix are interpreted as polynomials with coefficients in Galois Field GF (2). Multiplication of bytes is done 
in GF (24) with modulus the irreducible polynomial (x4+x+1) to ensure that the result is still within the filed 
GF (24). 
Let (a0,a1,a2,a3) the input nibbles of the MixColumns operation, the block at the output (b0,b1,b2,b3) 
is defined as follows: 
 
[
𝑏0 𝑏2
𝑏1 𝑏3
] = [
3 2
2 3
] [
𝑎0 𝑎2
𝑎1 𝑎3
]  
 
AddRoundKey: The last stage of each round is to add the round key. It consists of the bitwise XOR 
of the 16-bit state matrix and the 16-bit Key round. 
S-AES Key Expansion: In this process, three round keys are generated from the originated key, 
each key is used in different specific round, allowing increasing the security of S-AES. The keys used for 
encryption algorithm are also used for decryption. 
The key expansion algorithm creates round keys word by word, where a word is an array of 2 
nibbles, the algorithm produces 6 words, which are called  
 
W0, W1… W5.  
 
Where: K0=W0W1 , K1= W2W3 and K2 = W4W5. 
From the original key we generate the two byte W0 and W1. Next ,we can produce the others words 
using algorithm described as follow :  
 
S-AES Key Expansion 
For 2 ≤ i ≤ 5 do 
   If i ≡ 0(mod 2) then 
  Wi = Wi-2⊕ RCON(i/2) ⊕SubNib(RotNib(Wi-1)) 
  Else 
  Wi = Wi-1⊕ Wi-2 
  End if 
End for 
 
In this algorithm, RCON[i] = RC[i]0000, where RC[i] is defined as RC[i] =xi+2 ∈ GF(24) so  
RC[1] = x3 = 1000 and RC[2] = x4 = x +1 = 0011. If N0 and N1 are two nibbles and their concatenation 
denoted as N0N1. The RotNib an SubNib functions are defined to be: RotNib(N0N1)=N1N0 and 
SubNib(N0N1)=Sbox(N0)Sbox(N1) which means respectively rotate nibble and substitute nibble. 
Decryption: Decryption is the reverse process of encryption. It takes a 16-bit ciphertext, the 16-bit 
key, and generates the original 16-bit Plaintext. Similarly to encryption, decryption uses one pre-round and 
two round transformations, as shown in Figure 1. The processes performed during decryption are the inverse 
of those employed in encryption. 
 
 
3. ANT COLONY OPTIMIZATION (ACO) 
Optimization metaheuristics have a significant importance in determining efficient solutions of 
different complex and hard problems. Especially, Ant Colony Optimization, which represents a class of 
nature-inspired meta-heuristics, based on the behavior of real ant within their colonies. Dorigo et al. [10] 
proposes the first ACO algorithms in the early 1990s. The study of the behavior of ants within colonies 
inspires the development of these algorithms. However, ants are a social insects and their behavior is 
governed by the goal of colony survival being focused on the survival of individuals. First, ants explore 
randomly the area arounding their nest to search the food. When an ant finds food, it walks back to the 
colony leaving behind a pheromone trail on the ground that may depend on the quantity and the quality of the 
food. This pheromones trail will guide other ants to the food source. Old paths are less likely to be used 
because of the pheromone evaporation mechanism. This food supplies behavior has inspired the development 
of ACO, in particular, this ability to explore paths between food sources and their nest and finding the 
shortest one. 
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The first ACO algorithm, called Ant System (AS) introduced by Dorigo [10] was applied to 
Travelling Salesmen Problem. Other ACO variants mostly differ in the rule used for the solution construction 
and the pheromone update, including Ant Colony System (ACS) presented by Dorigo and Gambardella [11], 
and Min Max Ant System (MMAS) given by Stutzle and Hoos [12]. 
 
 
4. THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
Assuming that we know a part of plain text P and his corresponding ciphertext C during the 
optimization process. Let z the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs Pi /Ci. The main goal is to find the 
key that allows to performing this encryption. Using our proposed algorithm, we generate a candidate key Kc, 
which is used to decrypt the cypher text Ci. Then, a candidate plaintext PGi is generated. Furthermore, this 
candidate Plaintext is used in the fitness function defined in (3) to evaluate Kc. The Full Layout of our attack 
algorithm is described in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Layout of our attack algorithm 
 
 
In order to apply the ACO metaheuristic, we have modelled the search space to a n+1-nodes graph  
( n represent the key length used by S-AES). Every node in the graph is connected to the next node by two 
different edges, the upper edge is equal to 0 and the lower edge is equal to 1 as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Search space for cryptanalysis of SAES 
 
 
Each ant starts it tour from the start node N0 moving from left to right; its tour is finished at the last 
node Nn. At each Node, an ant can only select a single edge during a particular tour. Therefore, each 
complete path from the node N0 to Nn+1 that comply with the precedence constraints is considered as  
a feasible solution , it will consist of n-bit binary string which is considered as a candidate key. After all the 
ants have completed their tours, all the solutions generated during the current Cycle are evaluated and 
compared by the objective function, the candidate key with the best fitness value in each Cycle is saved as  
a global best ant KBest. 
 
4.1.  Solution construction 
Each ant constructs a key using the function Probabilistic Stepwise Construction based on  
a probabilistic move of ants across the nodes. For an ant k , the probability 𝑃𝑖𝑗 to moves from a node i to 
node i+1 following the path j is defined by (2). 
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P𝑖𝑗(k) = {
0               if not allowed 
τ𝑖𝑗(k)
α ρ𝑖𝑗(k)
β
∑ τ𝑖𝑙(k)
α
lϵ𝑆 ρ𝑖𝑙(k)
β     Otherwise      
     (2) 
 
Where S is the set of the possible path (0 and 1). 
This probability of moving from a node to node depend on two parameters. The first, the pheromone 
trail τ(i,j) on the edge between the two nodes. And second the heuristic value ρ(i,j) representing the a priori 
knowledge of desirability of the choice. The parameters α and β are parameters which determine the relative 
influence of pheromone trail versus heuristic value. 
 
 
4.2.  Heuristic value 
Heuristic value is essential for the generation of high-quality solutions in the early stages of the 
search process. Especially, when using heuristic value calculation method from the problem domain. In our 
approach, we have used a dynamic heuristic that has to be computed at each step of an ant’s walk. 
First, as explained previously, the candidate key with the best fitness value in each Cycle is saved as 
a global best ant (KBest). Then, at every node, ants uses heuristic value calculated as shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Heuristic value calculation 
 
 
Let Ni the current node as shown in Figure 4, an ant has to decide which path to follow to move to 
the next node Ni+1. The j is the edge to be choose , only two values are possible i.e. either 0 or 1.  
we define Hj as a concatenation of the current key (the partial solution ) from 0 to i and the j value and  
KBest from i+2 to n-1. \ 
 
Hj= {CurrentKey (from 0 to i-1) | j | KBest (i+1 to n-1)} 
 
So, the concatenated binary string Hj represente a guessed key which is evaluated using the fitness 
function, the obtained value is used as a heuristic value in (2).  
 
4.3.  Fitness function 
The quality of a generated key is assessed by its fitness function value. The main goal of a fitness 
function is to provide a measurable value for a given key that indicate its proxomity to the real key. It is  
a primordial component guiding the search algorithm to the best solutions within a large search space. 
Allowing so that to explore the search space more efficiently. 
Let z the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs Pi / Ci. To evaluate a candidate Key Kc,  
a candidate plaintext GPi is produced based on Kc. The fitness function F of the key Kc is defined in 3: 
 
𝐹(𝐾𝑐) =
 ∑ #(GPi ⊕ 𝑃i𝑧𝑖=1 )
𝑧∗16
   (3) 
 
⊕ represents the Xor operation, and # denotes the number of zeros in (GPi ⊕Pi). 
The range of F is [0,1]. Particularly, F is equal to 1, if all bits in GPi are identical to Pi for any i in 
[1-z]. In this case, the generated key is the real one, so our goal is to maximize the fitness function. 
 
4.4.  Pheromone update 
Initially, the quantity of pheromone in each edge is equal to 𝜏0 (initial pheromone value). Only the 
best solution (Kbest)in a particular Cycle (C) is allowed to update the pheromone values on the edges 
constituting the tour. The best ant information is also updated after each Cycle. The pheromones over the 
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edges constituting the tour of the best ant is updated using (4), so larger the fitness value, the greater is the 
amount pheromone concentrated. 
 
τ𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜎 ∗ 𝜏𝑖,𝑗  + 𝑄 ∗ 𝐹(K)     (4) 
 
Where Q is some constant and 𝜎 represent a pheromone evaporation (will be between 0 and 1), 
it consist to decreases the pheromone trail uniformly in all edges. This operation allows avoiding a premature 
convergence of the algorithm into a local optimal solution. 
 
Outline of ACO Algorithm: 
Step1: Perform initialization of pheromone  
Step2: Repeat the followings steps  
1. Complete the tours of (N) ants by making the decisions using probability (2) 
2. Calculate fitness value for the tours of (N) ants according to (3) 
3. Update best ant information and pheromone values on edges constituting the tours using (4) 
Step3: If a maximum number of Cycle (C) have been attained or threshold of fitness function is 
reached then stop 
Step4: Else go to Step 2 
 
 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Generally, the performances of any evolutionary computation algorithm are closely related to the 
parameters values. Therefore, one of the main challenge is to find the optimal parameters setting allowing to 
improve efficiency of our algorithm. The values of parameters assumed in this paper such as α, β (weight of 
pheromone and heuristic value), N (Number of Ants), C (Number of Cycle), ‘Q’ and σ were fine-tuned by  
a combination of several experiments in order to optimize the cryptanalysis process. The default value of the 
parameters was α=1, β=1, Q=2, 𝜎=0.97 and 𝜏0 = 5. We have implemented our algorithm with C++ language.  
 
5.1.  Key space analysis 
The first part of the experiments is to determine the optimal number of ants to use that allows 
finding the key in a minimal search space. The experimental results obtained in this part are illustrated in 
Table 1. In This table, we can see the number of keys searched before locating the reel key and the average 
number of Cycle C (The average is calculated on 1000 launch) needed for each value of N. 
 
 
Table 1. Experimental results for different values of N 
Used Key Number of cycles 
(C) needed 
Number of Ants 
(N) used 
Number of Keys 
browsed 
Key found 
C3F0 - 10 - BE56 
C3F0 - 20 - C5F0 
C3F0 - 30 - C12A 
C3F0 163 40 6520 C3F0 
C3F0 122 50 6100 C3F0 
C3F0 106 60 6360 C3F0 
C3F0 92 70 6440 C3F0 
C3F0 77 80 6160 C3F0 
C3F0 66 90 5940 C3F0 
C3F0 59 100 5900 C3F0 
C3F0 50 110 5500 C3F0 
C3F0 43 120 5160 C3F0 
C3F0 42 130 5460 C3F0 
C3F0 42 140 5880 C3F0 
C3F0 41 150 6150 C3F0 
 
 
As shown in Table 1, with a small number of ants (N<40), our algorithm cannot locate the real key, 
the number of ants is not enough large, thus the best solution found on each Cycle (which is used in 
pheromone update) is not enough good, which penalizes the convergence of the optimisation process to the 
right solution.  
As noted in the Table 1, with the values N=120 we need 43 Cycles to locate the real key (C=43), 
the real key is found in a minimum search space. The maximum fitness value is reached after checking 5160 
keys, thus being considerably lower (by a factor of 12) than the brute-force search space size (which is equal 
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to 216 possible keys), and lower than GA[7] and PSO[8] which need to explore 6000 and 6905 keys, 
respectively , to locate the real one. 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the number of keys browsed before locating the real key under the 
number of ants used (N), It is clear from Figure that when the number of Ants is greater than 128, the search 
space increases rapidly with no improvement of the number of Cycle (C). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of key searched evolution 
 
 
5.2.  Relevance of the fitness function  
The design of fitness function is a crucial step in evolution algorithms. In order to assess the 
relevance of our fitness function, the correlation coefficient ‘Corr’ between the cost function (3) and the 
number of corrected key elements (Number of correct bits in the key) is calculated using (5), for different 
values of z (number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs used). 
This coefficient is used to evaluate the relationship between the cost function and the number of key 
elements correctly recovered. In the case of a perfect direct (increasing) linear relationship we have Corr = 1, 
its means that we have a good mechanism for evaluation of generated key, therefore the convergence of our 
algorithm to the best key is most guaranteed. Inversely, in a perfect decreasing linear relationship we have 
Corr = -1. Figure 6 shows the value of the correlation coefficient between our fitness function and the 
number of corrected key elements, for different number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. To calculate this 
coefficient, we have used 1000 keys as sample, by calculating the fitness and the correct number of bits for 
each one. 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) =
𝑛 ∑ 𝑥𝑖 𝑦𝑖− ∑ 𝑥𝑖  ∑ 𝑦𝑖 
√𝑛 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2−(∑ 𝑥𝑖)
2 √𝑛 ∑ 𝑦𝑖
2−(∑ 𝑦𝑖)
2 
    (5) 
 
Where x and y are two arrays of n elements. 
As shown in Figure 6, the correlation coefficient increases with the number of pair used, but  
from 3 pairs required, we note a stagnation of this coefficient. The use of 3 pairs in the fitness function gives 
almost the same results as z=2, while the use of a single pair can drive the algorithm to a solution with a 
maximum fitness function value without being the right key. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Correlation coefficient evolution through number of known plaintext-ciphertext 
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5.3.  Number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs analysis 
Our proposed approach allows us to find the key using only two known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, 
whereas in other attacks the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required is reported in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Number of plaintext-ciphertext required for attacking 
Methodology Rounds attacked Number of Plaintext-Ciphertext 
pair required 
Linear cryptanalysis 
Musa [3] 
Round 1 109 
Linear cryptanalysis 
Davood [5] 
Round 1 116 
Round 1 & Round 2 548 
Linear cryptanalysis 
Bizaki [4] 
Round 1 & Round 2 96 
Using GA 
Vimalathithan [7] 
Round 1 & Round 2 3 
Our Approch using ACO Round 1 & Round 2 2 
 
 
A fitness function based on only one pair of known plaintext-ciphertext (z=1 in the (3)), we can find 
a solution that maximizes the fitness function but without being the reel key. Therefore, the need for a second 
pair proves necessary to confirm that is the right key. 
 
5.4.  Pheromone sensitivity analysis 
In order to analyse the pheromone trails effect within the solutions construction process. 
The number of ants (N) is fixed at 120 and β at 1. First, we used a rather strong pheromone concentration, 
illustrated by the value α = 2. As shown in Figure 7, we can observe as an early stagnation of research 
because of the algorithm has ceased exploring new possibilities. Inversely, with a too weak guidance of the 
search, we noticed an excessive exploration of the search space, this undesirable behaviour is illustrated in 
the Figure8 with α is equal to 0.5. As a result, the search algorithm is not able to converge to an 
optimal solution. 
The best results are obtained with α = 1.2. Thus, a quick convergence of the algorithm to the correct 
key is observed in this case. Concluding that the right parameters are those allowing a reasonable balance 
between a too narrow focus of the search process and a too weak guidance. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Fitness Function evolution for different values of α 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper the new approach to breaking Simplified-AES was presented using ant colony 
optimization. This method occurred to be quite effective and promising. The experimental results show that 
our approach is significantly faster and requires a smaller number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, when 
compared to others attacks. 
ACO provides a very powerful tool for the cryptanalysis of Simplified-AES, it is interesting to be 
applied to cryptanalysis of some others strong encryption algorithms like DES (Data encryption Algorithm) 
or AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng  ISSN: 2088-8708  
 
A cryptanalytic attack of simplified-AES using ant colony optimization (Hicham Grari) 
4295 
REFERENCES  
[1] Salabat Khan, Armughan Ali and Mehr Yahya Durrani, "Ant-Crypto, a Cryptographer for Data Encryption 
Standard," IJCSI, vol. 10, no 1, Jan 2013. 
[2] Hicham Grari, Ahmed Azouaoui Khalid Zine-Dine, "A Novel Ant Colony Optimization Based Cryptanalysis of 
Substitution Cipher," International Afro-European Conference for Industrial Advancement AECIA, 2016. 
[3] M. A. Musa, E.F. Schaefer, S. Wedig, "A Simplified AES algorithm and its linear and Differential Cryptanalysis", 
Cryptologia, pp.148-177, Apr 2003. 
[4] H. K. Bizaki, S. David Mansoor, A. Falahati, "Linear Cryptanalysis on Second Round Mini-AES", International 
Conference on Information and Communication Techmologies, 2006, pp. 1958-1962. 
[5] S. D. Mansoori, H. Khaleghei Bizaki, "On the Vulnerability of Simplified AES Algorithm Against Linear 
Cryptanalysis," International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security, vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 257- 263, 2007. 
[6] Simmons S., "Algebraic cryptanalysis of simplified AES," Cryptologia, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 305–314, 2009. 
[7] Vimalathithan M. Omana, C. Metra, "Cryptanalysis of Simplified-AES Encrypted Communication," International 
Journal of Computer Science and Information Security (IJCSIS), vol. 13, no. 10, Oct 2015. 
[8] Valarmathi M. L., Vimalathithan, R., "Cryptanalysis of simplified-aes using particle swarm optimization," Defence 
Sci. J., vol. 62, no. 2, 117–121, 2012. 
[9] Rania Saeed (B) and Ashraf Bhery, "Cryptanalysis of Simplified-AES Using Intelligent Agent," 10th International 
Conference, HAIS 2015, Bilbao, Spain, June 22-24, 2015. 
[10] M. Dorigo, V. Maniezzo, A. Colorni, "The ant system: Optimization by a colony of cooperating agents," IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics-Part B, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 29-41, 1996. 
[11] M. Dorigo, L. Gambardella, "Ant colony system: A cooperative learning approach to the traveling salesman 
problem," IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 1, pp.1, pp. 53 -66, 1997. 
[12] T. Stutzle and H. Hoos, "Improvements on the ant system, introducing the MAX-MIN ant system," in Proc. 
ICANNGA97—Third Int. Conf.Artificial Neural Networks and Genetic Algorithms, Wien, Germany: Springer-
Verlag, 1997. 
 
 
BIOGRAPHIES OF AUTHORS 
 
 
Hicham Grari is a PhD student within the LAROSERI Lab. at Faculty of Sciences – Chouaib 
Doukkali University, El Jadida/Morocco. He holds an Engineer Degree in Computer Science in 
2005. His doctoral research investigates the use of metaheuristics in cryptology field. 
 
  
 
Ahmed Azououi received his license in Computer Science and Engineering in June-2001 and 
Master in Computer Science and Telecommunication from University of Mohammed V - Agdal, 
Rabat, Morocco in 2003. He received his PHD in Computer Science in 2014 and Engineering at 
Department of Computer Science, ENSIAS (National School of Computer Science and Systems 
Analysis), Rabat, Morocco. Currently, he is an Associate Professor at Department of Computer 
Science, Faculty of sciences, University Chouaib Doukkaly, El Jadida, Morocco. His areas of 
interest are Information systems, Coding Theory and Artificial Intelligence. 
  
 
Khalid Zine-Dine received his PhD degree from the Mohammed V University of Rabat, Morocco, 
in 2000. He spent four years in bank Information System as a network & system security project 
manager. Currently, he is an Associate Professor and lead of LAROSERI Lab. at Faculty of  
Sciences – Chouaib Doukkali University, El Jadida/Morocco. His research interests are in the area of 
wireless ad hoc and sensor networks, Mobility, cloud computing, microgrid and system & network 
architectures and protocols. Dr. Zine- Dine was a co-organizer and co-chair of conferences and is 
involved in more than 06 PhD Thesis and funded research projects. 
 
